


## 4.13 Weaknesses in many COVID-19 evidence-support systems


The COVID-19 pandemic has been a global crisis marked by the need for rapid-fire decision-making by high-level government authorities over several ‘waves’, and by both significant uncertainty and a quickly evolving (and often indirect) evidence base. In many jurisdictions, evidence appeared to play a more visible role in government policymaking during the COVID-19 pandemic than it has in many decades. That said, misinformation flourished, and citizens and other stakeholders struggled to understand why the evidence changed over time. ‘Other things’ than best evidence often had greater visibility than best evidence, and some forms of evidence often had greater visibility than others. We addressed misinformation in [section 4.11](#) and we provided additional context for the terms used here in [sections 4.8](#) (‘other things’ than best evidence), [4.2](#) (forms of evidence) and [4.5](#) (distinguishing high- from low-quality evidence).

### ‘Other things’ than best evidence that were more typically encountered by COVID-19 decision-makers



\* As noted in [section 4.8](#), we use the term ‘hubcap chasing’ (i.e., dogs repeatedly barking at and chasing cars) as a metaphor for sharing and commenting upon each new study that captures one’s attention.

## Forms of evidence that were more typically encountered by COVID-19 decision-makers



Leaders in any jurisdiction can use the Evidence Commission report to systematize and broaden beyond health the aspects of the evidence response to COVID-19 that went well and to address the many aspects that did not go well. As part of systematizing what went well, these leaders will need to transition from the COVID-19-era focus on speed and as much quality as possible ('quick and clean enough') to a balance among speed, quality (e.g., waiting for evidence that is just around the corner), and sustainability (e.g., normal working hours and other work not put on hold).